https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Relay_Chat
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) is an application layer protocol that facilitates communication in text. The chat process works on a client/server networking model. IRC clients are computer programs that users can install on their system or web-based applications running either locally in the browser or on a third-party server.
These clients communicate with chat servers to transfer messages to other clients.
IRC is a plaintext protocol that is officially assigned port 194, according to IANA. However, running the service on this port requires running it with root-level permissions, which is inadvisable. As a result, the well- known port for IRC is 6667, a high-number port that does not require elevated privileges. However, an IRC server can also be configured to run on other ports as well.
You can't tell if an IRC server is designed to be malicious solely based on port number. Still, if you see an IRC server running on port a WKP such as 80, 8080, 53, 443, it's almost always going to be malicious; the only real reason for IRCD to be running on port 80 is to try to evade firewalls.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Application_firewall
An application firewall is a form of firewall that controls input/output or system calls of an application or service. It operates by monitoring and blocking communications based on a configured policy, generally with predefined rule sets to choose from. The application firewall can control communications up to the OSI model's application layer, which is the highest operating layer, and where it gets its name. The two primary categories of application firewalls are network-based and host-based.
Application layer filtering operates at a higher level than traditional security appliances. This allows packet decisions to be made based on more than just source/destination IP Addresses or ports. It can also use information spanning across multiple connections for any given host.
Network-based application firewalls
Network-based application firewalls operate at the application layer of a TCP/IP stack. They can understand certain applications and protocols such as File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Domain Name System (DNS), or Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). This allows it to identify unwanted applications or services using a non- standard port or detect if an allowed protocol is being abused.
Host-based application firewalls
A host-based application firewall monitors application system calls or other general system communication.
This gives more granularity and control but is limited to only protecting the host it is running on. Control is applied by filtering on a per-process basis. Generally, prompts are used to define rules for processes that have not yet received a connection. Further filtering can be done by examining the process ID of the owner of the data packets. Many host-based application firewalls are combined or used in conjunction with a packet filter.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nikto_(vulnerability_scanner)
Nikto is a free software command-line vulnerability scanner that scans web servers for dangerous files/CGIs, outdated server software, and other problems. It performs generic and server types specific checks. It also captures and prints any cookies received. The Nikto code itself is free software, but the data files it uses to drive the program are not.

This question shows a classic example of an IDOR vulnerability. Rob substitutes Ned's name in the "name" parameter and if the developer has not fixed this vulnerability, then Rob will gain access to Ned's account.
Below you will find more detailed information about IDOR vulnerability.
Insecure direct object references (IDOR) are a cybersecurity issue that occurs when a web application developer uses an identifier for direct access to an internal implementation object but provides no additional access control and/or authorization checks. For example, an IDOR vulnerability would happen if the URL of a transaction could be changed through client-side user input to show unauthorized data of another transaction.
Most web applications use simple IDs to reference objects. For example, a user in a database will usually be referred to via the user ID. The same user ID is the primary key to the database column containing user information and is generated automatically. The database key generation algorithm is very simple: it usually uses the next available integer. The same database ID generation mechanisms are used for all other types of database records.
The approach described above is legitimate but not recommended because it could enable the attacker to enumerate all users. If it's necessary to maintain this approach, the developer must at least make absolutely sure that more than just a reference is needed to access resources. For example, let's say that the web application displays transaction details using the following URL:
* https://www.example.com/transaction.php?id=74656
A malicious hacker could try to substitute the id parameter value 74656 with other similar values, for example:
* https://www.example.com/transaction.php?id=74657
The 74657 transaction could be a valid transaction belonging to another user. The malicious hacker should not be authorized to see it. However, if the developer made an error, the attacker would see this transaction and hence we would have an insecure direct object reference vulnerability.