Option A: Disabling detection policies creates blind spots in security monitoring, making the environment more vulnerable. Policies should be fine-tuned, not deactivated.
Option B: Reclassifying a detection as a false positive without proper investigation can allow threats to persist in the environment. Accurate classification is essential for maintaining security posture.
Option C: Reviewing detection details provides critical insights into the attack chain, including how the threat was introduced and propagated. This step allows for a comprehensive understanding of the incident, enabling targeted and effective remediation. Skipping this step could lead to incomplete resolution or recurrence of the issue.
Option D: While quarantining a host can prevent further damage, doing so without understanding the detection context may result in unnecessary disruption or an incomplete response to the incident.

Option A: Immediately deleting assets without investigation can cause disruptions if they are in use by critical services. Verification is essential before taking action.
Option B: Unmanaged public-facing assets pose a significant security risk. The best practice is to identify ownership, assess their legitimacy, and either enforce security policies or decommission them if unnecessary. Shadow IT, forgotten deployments, or misconfigured assets can all lead to breaches.
Option C: Network segmentation can limit exposure, but it does not address the root cause--why these assets exist and whether they are necessary or unauthorized.
Option D: Restricting outbound traffic may reduce risk, but it does not address the issue of unmanaged public exposure. Attackers could still exploit misconfigurations or known vulnerabilities on these assets.

Option A: While IAM policies can restrict access to certain cloud resources, they are not the correct method for configuring scan exclusions in Falcon Cloud Security. Using IAM policies in this way could inadvertently prevent security visibility rather than properly configuring exclusions.
Option B: The Falcon agent is primarily used for endpoint and workload protection but does not control Falcon cloud security scans, which operate at the cloud account level. Configuring agent settings would not prevent cloud security scans from occurring.
Option C: Falcon Cloud Security allows administrators to configure scan exclusions through the Falcon console, where they can define rules based on resource tags, cloud accounts, or regions.
This ensures that security scans avoid designated resources while still protecting the overall cloud environment. Exclusions can help reduce noise from security alerts and improve efficiency in large-scale environments.
Option D: Kubernetes Pod Security Policies (PSPs) control security settings for pods but do not affect Falcon Cloud Security's cloud-native scanning capabilities. PSPs define restrictions for running containers, such as preventing privileged access, but they do not manage scan exclusions.

Option A: Manually deploying a new container image does not indicate runtime drift unless it occurs in an unauthorized manner or introduces unexpected changes to a running container.
Option B: A container failing to start due to a misconfiguration is a deployment issue, not an instance of runtime drift.
Option C: Runtime drift occurs when a container's behavior deviates from its original image, such as spawning unauthorized processes, modifying system binaries, or introducing unexpected changes. This is a strong indicator of potential compromise or malicious activity.
Option D: Rolling updates are a legitimate deployment strategy and do not indicate runtime drift unless they introduce unexpected changes outside of the intended update process.

Option A: The Falcon Container Sensor is deployed in a Kubernetes cluster using a Helm chart or Kubernetes manifest. This deployment method ensures that the sensor is configured correctly and adheres to Kubernetes deployment standards. Helm charts simplify the deployment process by automating configurations and managing dependencies.
Option B: The Falcon Container Sensor supports both Docker and other container runtimes, such as containerd, as per Kubernetes standards. Limiting it to Docker would ignore the flexibility offered by modern Kubernetes environments.
Option C: While Falcon Container Sensor supports managed Kubernetes services like Amazon EKS and Google GKE, it is not a strict requirement. The sensor can also be deployed in self- managed Kubernetes clusters.
Option D: Running containers with root privileges is a security risk and not a requirement for deploying the Falcon Container Sensor. The sensor operates without requiring such elevated privileges for application containers.