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Question 106
Which of the following statements is not listed within the 4 canons of the (ISC)2 Code of Ethics?
Correct Answer: D
"Thou shall think about the social consequences of the program you are writing or
the system you are designing." is the ninth commandment of the Computer Ethics Institute and is
not part of the (ISC)2 Code of Ethics.
Code of Ethics Preamble
Safety of the commonwealth, duty to our principals (employers, contractors, people we work for),
and to each other requires that we adhere, and be seen to adhere, to the highest ethical standards
of behavior. Therefore, strict adherence to this Code is a condition of certification.
Code of Ethics Canons:
There are 4 high level canons within the ISC2 code of ethics, below you have the details of what
apply to each of them.
1.Protect society, the commonwealth, and the infrastructure Promote and preserve public trust and confidence in information and systems Promote the understanding and acceptance of prudent information security measures Preserve and strengthen the integrity of the public infrastructure Discourage unsafe practice
2.Act honorably, honestly, justly, responsibly, and legally Tell the truth; make all stakeholders aware of your actions on a timely basis Observe all contracts and agreements, express or implied Treat all members fairly. In resolving conflicts, consider public safety and duties to principals, individuals, and the profession in that order Give prudent advice; avoid raising unnecessary alarm or giving unwarranted comfort Take care to be truthful, objective, cautious, and within your competence When resolving differing laws in different jurisdictions, give preference to the laws of the jurisdiction in which you render your service
3.Provide diligent and competent service to principals Preserve the value of their systems, applications, and information Respect their trust and the privileges that they grant you Avoid conflicts of interest or the appearance thereof Render only those services for which you are fully competent and qualified
4.Advance and protect the profession Sponsor for professional advancement those best qualified. All other things equal, prefer those who are certified and who adhere to these canons. Avoid professional association with those whose practices or reputation might diminish the profession Take care not to injure the reputation of other professionals through malice or indifference Maintain your competence; keep your skills and knowledge current. Give generously of your time and knowledge in training others
Reference used for this question: (ISC)2 Code of Ethics. Available at: https://www.isc2.org/uploadedFiles/%28ISC%292_Public_Content/Code_of_ethics/ISC2-Code-of-Ethics.pdf
the system you are designing." is the ninth commandment of the Computer Ethics Institute and is
not part of the (ISC)2 Code of Ethics.
Code of Ethics Preamble
Safety of the commonwealth, duty to our principals (employers, contractors, people we work for),
and to each other requires that we adhere, and be seen to adhere, to the highest ethical standards
of behavior. Therefore, strict adherence to this Code is a condition of certification.
Code of Ethics Canons:
There are 4 high level canons within the ISC2 code of ethics, below you have the details of what
apply to each of them.
1.Protect society, the commonwealth, and the infrastructure Promote and preserve public trust and confidence in information and systems Promote the understanding and acceptance of prudent information security measures Preserve and strengthen the integrity of the public infrastructure Discourage unsafe practice
2.Act honorably, honestly, justly, responsibly, and legally Tell the truth; make all stakeholders aware of your actions on a timely basis Observe all contracts and agreements, express or implied Treat all members fairly. In resolving conflicts, consider public safety and duties to principals, individuals, and the profession in that order Give prudent advice; avoid raising unnecessary alarm or giving unwarranted comfort Take care to be truthful, objective, cautious, and within your competence When resolving differing laws in different jurisdictions, give preference to the laws of the jurisdiction in which you render your service
3.Provide diligent and competent service to principals Preserve the value of their systems, applications, and information Respect their trust and the privileges that they grant you Avoid conflicts of interest or the appearance thereof Render only those services for which you are fully competent and qualified
4.Advance and protect the profession Sponsor for professional advancement those best qualified. All other things equal, prefer those who are certified and who adhere to these canons. Avoid professional association with those whose practices or reputation might diminish the profession Take care not to injure the reputation of other professionals through malice or indifference Maintain your competence; keep your skills and knowledge current. Give generously of your time and knowledge in training others
Reference used for this question: (ISC)2 Code of Ethics. Available at: https://www.isc2.org/uploadedFiles/%28ISC%292_Public_Content/Code_of_ethics/ISC2-Code-of-Ethics.pdf
Question 107
Which of the following is an important design feature for the outer door o f a mantrap?
Correct Answer: A
Mantraps work by using an interdependent locking/unlocking methodology, which grants access to the second door only when the first door has been properly locked. The person trapped inside must wait for the first door to lock and then provide the necessary credentials, such as passcodes or biometric authentication, to be able to go through the second door.
Question 108
The Kennedy-Kassebaum Act is also known as:
Correct Answer: A
The others refer to other laws or guidelines.
Question 109
In the Bell-LaPadula model, the Star-property is also called:
Correct Answer: C
The Bell-LaPadula model focuses on data confidentiality and access to classified information, in contrast to the Biba Integrity Model which describes rules for the protection of data integrity. In this formal model, the entities in an information system are divided into subjects and objects.
The notion of a "secure state" is defined, and it is proven that each state transition preserves security by moving from secure state to secure state, thereby proving that the system satisfies the security objectives of the model.
The Bell-LaPadula model is built on the concept of a state machine with a set of allowable states in a system. The transition from one state to another state is defined by transition functions.
A system state is defined to be "secure" if the only permitted access modes of subjects to objects are in accordance with a security policy. To determine whether a specific access mode is allowed, the clearance of a subject is compared to the classification of the object (more precisely, to the combination of classification and set of compartments, making up the security level) to determine if the subject is authorized for the specific access mode.
The clearance/classification scheme is expressed in terms of a lattice. The model defines two mandatory access control (MAC) rules and one discretionary access control (DAC) rule with three security properties:
The Simple Security Property - a subject at a given security level may not read an object at a higher security level (no read-up).
The *-property (read "star"-property) - a subject at a given security level must not write to any object at a lower security level (no write-down). The *-property is also known as the Confinement property.
The Discretionary Security Property - use an access control matrix to specify the discretionary access control.
The transfer of information from a high-sensitivity document to a lower-sensitivity document may happen in the Bell-LaPadula model via the concept of trusted subjects. Trusted Subjects are not restricted by the *-property. Untrusted subjects are. Trusted Subjects must be shown to be trustworthy with regard to the security policy. This security model is directed toward access control and is characterized by the phrase: "no read up, no write down." Compare the Biba model, the Clark-Wilson model and the Chinese Wall.
With Bell-LaPadula, users can create content only at or above their own security level (i.e. secret researchers can create secret or top-secret files but may not create public files; no write-down). Conversely, users can view content only at or below their own security level (i.e. secret researchers can view public or secret files, but may not view top-secret files; no read-up). Strong * Property The Strong * Property is an alternative to the *-Property in which subjects may write to objects with only a matching security level. Thus, the write-up operation permitted in the usual *-Property is not present, only a write-to-same level operation. The Strong * Property is usually discussed in the context of multilevel database management systems and is motivated by integrity concerns. Tranquility principle
The tranquility principle of the Bell-LaPadula model states that the classification of a subject or object does not change while it is being referenced. There are two forms to the tranquility principle: the "principle of strong tranquility" states that security levels do not change during the normal operation of the system and the "principle of weak tranquility" states that security levels do not change in a way that violates the rules of a given security policy.
Another interpretation of the tranquility principles is that they both apply only to the period of time during which an operation involving an object or subject is occurring. That is, the strong tranquility principle means that an object's security level/label will not change during an operation (such as read or write); the weak tranquility principle means that an object's security level/label may change in a way that does not violate the security policy during an operation.
Reference(s) used for this question:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biba_Model http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discretionary_access_control http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clark-Wilson_model http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brewer_and_Nash_model
The notion of a "secure state" is defined, and it is proven that each state transition preserves security by moving from secure state to secure state, thereby proving that the system satisfies the security objectives of the model.
The Bell-LaPadula model is built on the concept of a state machine with a set of allowable states in a system. The transition from one state to another state is defined by transition functions.
A system state is defined to be "secure" if the only permitted access modes of subjects to objects are in accordance with a security policy. To determine whether a specific access mode is allowed, the clearance of a subject is compared to the classification of the object (more precisely, to the combination of classification and set of compartments, making up the security level) to determine if the subject is authorized for the specific access mode.
The clearance/classification scheme is expressed in terms of a lattice. The model defines two mandatory access control (MAC) rules and one discretionary access control (DAC) rule with three security properties:
The Simple Security Property - a subject at a given security level may not read an object at a higher security level (no read-up).
The *-property (read "star"-property) - a subject at a given security level must not write to any object at a lower security level (no write-down). The *-property is also known as the Confinement property.
The Discretionary Security Property - use an access control matrix to specify the discretionary access control.
The transfer of information from a high-sensitivity document to a lower-sensitivity document may happen in the Bell-LaPadula model via the concept of trusted subjects. Trusted Subjects are not restricted by the *-property. Untrusted subjects are. Trusted Subjects must be shown to be trustworthy with regard to the security policy. This security model is directed toward access control and is characterized by the phrase: "no read up, no write down." Compare the Biba model, the Clark-Wilson model and the Chinese Wall.
With Bell-LaPadula, users can create content only at or above their own security level (i.e. secret researchers can create secret or top-secret files but may not create public files; no write-down). Conversely, users can view content only at or below their own security level (i.e. secret researchers can view public or secret files, but may not view top-secret files; no read-up). Strong * Property The Strong * Property is an alternative to the *-Property in which subjects may write to objects with only a matching security level. Thus, the write-up operation permitted in the usual *-Property is not present, only a write-to-same level operation. The Strong * Property is usually discussed in the context of multilevel database management systems and is motivated by integrity concerns. Tranquility principle
The tranquility principle of the Bell-LaPadula model states that the classification of a subject or object does not change while it is being referenced. There are two forms to the tranquility principle: the "principle of strong tranquility" states that security levels do not change during the normal operation of the system and the "principle of weak tranquility" states that security levels do not change in a way that violates the rules of a given security policy.
Another interpretation of the tranquility principles is that they both apply only to the period of time during which an operation involving an object or subject is occurring. That is, the strong tranquility principle means that an object's security level/label will not change during an operation (such as read or write); the weak tranquility principle means that an object's security level/label may change in a way that does not violate the security policy during an operation.
Reference(s) used for this question:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biba_Model http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discretionary_access_control http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clark-Wilson_model http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brewer_and_Nash_model
Question 110
An organization adopts a new firewall hardening standard. How can the security professional verify that the technical staff correct implemented the new standard?
Correct Answer: B
Explanation
Section: Security Operations
Section: Security Operations
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