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Question 942
The criteria for evaluating the legal requirements for implementing safeguards is to evaluate the cost (C) of instituting the protection versus the estimated loss (L) resulting from the exploitation of the corresponding vulnerability. Therefore, a legal liability may exists when:
Correct Answer: A
Explanation/Reference:
If the cost is lower than the estimated loss (C < L), then legal liability may exists if you fail to implement the proper safeguards.
Government laws and regulations require companies to employ reasonable security measures to reduce private harms such as identity theft due to unauthorized access. The U.S. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) Safeguards Rule and the broader European Directive 95/46/EC, Article 17, both require that companies employ reasonable or
appropriate administrative and technical security measures to protect consumer information.
The GLBA is a U.S. Federal law enacted by U.S. Congress in 1998 to allow consolidation among commercial banks. The GLBA Safeguards Rule is U.S. Federal regulation created in reaction to the GLBA and enforced by the U.S.
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The Safeguards Rule requires companies to implement a security plan to protect the confidentiality and integrity of consumer personal information and requires the designation of an individual responsible for compliance.
Because these laws and regulations govern consumer personal information, they can lead to new requirements for information systems for which companies are responsible to comply.
The act of compliance includes demonstrating due diligence, which is defined as "reasonable efforts that persons make to satisfy legal requirements or discharge their legal obligations". Reasonableness in software systems includes industries standards and may allow for imperfection. Lawyers representing firms and other organizations, regulators, system administrators and engineers all face considerable challenge in determining what constitutes "reasonable" security measures for several reasons, including:
1. Compliance changes with the emergence of new security vulnerabilities due to innovations in information technology;
2. Compliance requires knowledge of specific security measures, however publicly available best practices typically include general goals and only address broad categories of vulnerability; and
3. Compliance is a best-effort practice, because improving security is costly and companies must prioritize security spending commensurate with risk of non-compliance. In general, the costs of improved security are certain, but the
improvement in security depends on unknown variables and probabilities outside the control of companies.
The following reference(s) were used for this question:
KRUTZ, Ronald L. & VINES, Russel D., The CISSP Prep Guide: Mastering the Ten Domains of Computer Security, 2001, John Wiley & Sons, Page 315.
and
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~breaux/publications/tdbreaux-cose10.pdf
If the cost is lower than the estimated loss (C < L), then legal liability may exists if you fail to implement the proper safeguards.
Government laws and regulations require companies to employ reasonable security measures to reduce private harms such as identity theft due to unauthorized access. The U.S. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) Safeguards Rule and the broader European Directive 95/46/EC, Article 17, both require that companies employ reasonable or
appropriate administrative and technical security measures to protect consumer information.
The GLBA is a U.S. Federal law enacted by U.S. Congress in 1998 to allow consolidation among commercial banks. The GLBA Safeguards Rule is U.S. Federal regulation created in reaction to the GLBA and enforced by the U.S.
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The Safeguards Rule requires companies to implement a security plan to protect the confidentiality and integrity of consumer personal information and requires the designation of an individual responsible for compliance.
Because these laws and regulations govern consumer personal information, they can lead to new requirements for information systems for which companies are responsible to comply.
The act of compliance includes demonstrating due diligence, which is defined as "reasonable efforts that persons make to satisfy legal requirements or discharge their legal obligations". Reasonableness in software systems includes industries standards and may allow for imperfection. Lawyers representing firms and other organizations, regulators, system administrators and engineers all face considerable challenge in determining what constitutes "reasonable" security measures for several reasons, including:
1. Compliance changes with the emergence of new security vulnerabilities due to innovations in information technology;
2. Compliance requires knowledge of specific security measures, however publicly available best practices typically include general goals and only address broad categories of vulnerability; and
3. Compliance is a best-effort practice, because improving security is costly and companies must prioritize security spending commensurate with risk of non-compliance. In general, the costs of improved security are certain, but the
improvement in security depends on unknown variables and probabilities outside the control of companies.
The following reference(s) were used for this question:
KRUTZ, Ronald L. & VINES, Russel D., The CISSP Prep Guide: Mastering the Ten Domains of Computer Security, 2001, John Wiley & Sons, Page 315.
and
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~breaux/publications/tdbreaux-cose10.pdf
Question 943
How is Annualized Loss Expectancy (ALE) derived from a threat?
Correct Answer: B
Section: Risk, Response and Recovery
Explanation/Reference:
Three steps are undertaken in a quantitative risk assessment:
Initial management approval
Construction of a risk assessment team, and
The review of information currently available within the organization.
There are a few formulas that you MUST understand for the exam. See them below:
SLE (Single Loss Expectancy)
Single loss expectancy (SLE) must be calculated to provide an estimate of loss. SLE is defined as the difference between the original value and the remaining value of an asset after a single exploit.
The formula for calculating SLE is as follows: SLE = asset value (in $) x exposure factor (loss due to successful threat exploit, as a %) Losses can include lack of availability of data assets due to data loss, theft, alteration, or denial of service (perhaps due to business continuity or security issues).
ALE (Annualized Loss Expectancy)
Next, the organization would calculate the annualized rate of occurrence (ARO).
This is done to provide an accurate calculation of annualized loss expectancy (ALE).
ARO is an estimate of how often a threat will be successful in exploiting a vulnerability over the period of a year.
When this is completed, the organization calculates the annualized loss expectancy (ALE).
The ALE is a product of the yearly estimate for the exploit (ARO) and the loss in value of an asset after an SLE.
The calculation follows ALE = SLE x ARO
Note that this calculation can be adjusted for geographical distances using the local annual frequency estimate (LAFE) or the standard annual frequency estimate (SAFE). Given that there is now a value for SLE, it is possible to determine what the organization should spend, if anything, to apply a countermeasure for the risk in question.
Remember that no countermeasure should be greater in cost than the risk it mitigates, transfers, or avoids.
Countermeasure cost per year is easy and straightforward to calculate. It is simply the cost of the countermeasure divided by the years of its life (i.e., use within the organization). Finally, the organization is able to compare the cost of the risk versus the cost of the countermeasure and make some objective decisions regarding its countermeasure selection.
The following were incorrect answers:
All of the other choices were incorrect.
The following reference(s) were used for this quesiton:
Hernandez CISSP, Steven (2012-12-21). Official (ISC)2 Guide to the CISSP CBK, Third Edition ((ISC)2 Press) (Kindle Locations 10048-10069). Auerbach Publications. Kindle Edition.
Explanation/Reference:
Three steps are undertaken in a quantitative risk assessment:
Initial management approval
Construction of a risk assessment team, and
The review of information currently available within the organization.
There are a few formulas that you MUST understand for the exam. See them below:
SLE (Single Loss Expectancy)
Single loss expectancy (SLE) must be calculated to provide an estimate of loss. SLE is defined as the difference between the original value and the remaining value of an asset after a single exploit.
The formula for calculating SLE is as follows: SLE = asset value (in $) x exposure factor (loss due to successful threat exploit, as a %) Losses can include lack of availability of data assets due to data loss, theft, alteration, or denial of service (perhaps due to business continuity or security issues).
ALE (Annualized Loss Expectancy)
Next, the organization would calculate the annualized rate of occurrence (ARO).
This is done to provide an accurate calculation of annualized loss expectancy (ALE).
ARO is an estimate of how often a threat will be successful in exploiting a vulnerability over the period of a year.
When this is completed, the organization calculates the annualized loss expectancy (ALE).
The ALE is a product of the yearly estimate for the exploit (ARO) and the loss in value of an asset after an SLE.
The calculation follows ALE = SLE x ARO
Note that this calculation can be adjusted for geographical distances using the local annual frequency estimate (LAFE) or the standard annual frequency estimate (SAFE). Given that there is now a value for SLE, it is possible to determine what the organization should spend, if anything, to apply a countermeasure for the risk in question.
Remember that no countermeasure should be greater in cost than the risk it mitigates, transfers, or avoids.
Countermeasure cost per year is easy and straightforward to calculate. It is simply the cost of the countermeasure divided by the years of its life (i.e., use within the organization). Finally, the organization is able to compare the cost of the risk versus the cost of the countermeasure and make some objective decisions regarding its countermeasure selection.
The following were incorrect answers:
All of the other choices were incorrect.
The following reference(s) were used for this quesiton:
Hernandez CISSP, Steven (2012-12-21). Official (ISC)2 Guide to the CISSP CBK, Third Edition ((ISC)2 Press) (Kindle Locations 10048-10069). Auerbach Publications. Kindle Edition.
Question 944
Which of the following statements pertaining to using Kerberos without any extension is false?
Correct Answer: C
Kerberos is a trusted, credential-based, third-party authentication protocol that uses symmetric (secret) key cryptography to provide robust authentication to clients accessing services on a network.
Because a client's password is used in the initiation of the Kerberos request for the service protocol, password guessing can be used to impersonate a client.
Here is a nice overview of HOW Kerberos is implement as described in RFC 4556:
1. Introduction
The Kerberos V5 protocol [RFC4120] involves use of a trusted third party known as the Key Distribution Center (KDC) to negotiate shared session keys between clients and services and provide mutual authentication between them.
The corner-stones of Kerberos V5 are the Ticket and the Authenticator. A Ticket encapsulates a symmetric key (the ticket session key) in an envelope (a public message) intended for a specific service. The contents of the Ticket are encrypted with a symmetric key shared between the service principal and the issuing KDC. The encrypted part of the Ticket contains the client principal name, among other items. An Authenticator is a record that can be shown to have been recently generated using the ticket session key in the associated Ticket. The ticket session key is known by the client who requested the ticket. The contents of the Authenticator are encrypted with the associated ticket session key. The encrypted part of an Authenticator contains a timestamp and the client principal name, among other items.
As shown in Figure 1, below, the Kerberos V5 protocol consists of the following message exchanges between the client and the KDC, and the client and the application service:
The Authentication Service (AS) Exchange
The client obtains an "initial" ticket from the Kerberos
authentication server (AS), typically a Ticket Granting Ticket
(TGT). The AS-REQ message and the AS-REP message are the request
and the reply message, respectively, between the client and the
AS.
The Ticket Granting Service (TGS) Exchange
The client subsequently uses the TGT to authenticate and request a
service ticket for a particular service, from the Kerberos
ticket-granting server (TGS). The TGS-REQ message and the TGS-REP
message are the request and the reply message respectively between
the client and the TGS.
The Client/Server Authentication Protocol (AP) Exchange
The client then makes a request with an AP-REQ message, consisting
of a service ticket and an authenticator that certifies the
client's possession of the ticket session key. The server may
optionally reply with an AP-REP message. AP exchanges typically
negotiate session-specific symmetric keys.
Usually, the AS and TGS are integrated in a single device also known
as the KDC.
+--------------+
+--------->| KDC |
AS-REQ / +-------| |
/ / +--------------+
/ / ^ |
/ |AS-REP / |
| | / TGS-REQ + TGS-REP
| | / /
| | / /
| | / +---------+
| | / /
| | / /
| | / /
| v / v
++-------+------+ +-----------------+
| Client +------------>| Application |
| | AP-REQ | Server |
| |<------------| |
+---------------+ AP-REP +-----------------+
Figure 1: The Message Exchanges in the Kerberos V5 Protocol
In the AS exchange, the KDC reply contains the ticket session key,
among other items, that is encrypted using a key (the AS reply key)
shared between the client and the KDC. The AS reply key is typically
derived from the client's password for human users. Therefore, for
human users, the attack resistance strength of the Kerberos protocol
is no stronger than the strength of their passwords.
Source: KRUTZ, Ronald L. & VINES, Russel D., The CISSP Prep Guide: Mastering the
Ten Domains of Computer Security, John Wiley & Sons, 2001, Chapter 2: Access control
systems (page 40).
And
HARRIS, Shon, All-In-One CISSP Certification Exam Guide, McGraw-Hill/Osborne, 2002,
chapter 4: Access Control (pages 147-151).
and
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4556.txt
Because a client's password is used in the initiation of the Kerberos request for the service protocol, password guessing can be used to impersonate a client.
Here is a nice overview of HOW Kerberos is implement as described in RFC 4556:
1. Introduction
The Kerberos V5 protocol [RFC4120] involves use of a trusted third party known as the Key Distribution Center (KDC) to negotiate shared session keys between clients and services and provide mutual authentication between them.
The corner-stones of Kerberos V5 are the Ticket and the Authenticator. A Ticket encapsulates a symmetric key (the ticket session key) in an envelope (a public message) intended for a specific service. The contents of the Ticket are encrypted with a symmetric key shared between the service principal and the issuing KDC. The encrypted part of the Ticket contains the client principal name, among other items. An Authenticator is a record that can be shown to have been recently generated using the ticket session key in the associated Ticket. The ticket session key is known by the client who requested the ticket. The contents of the Authenticator are encrypted with the associated ticket session key. The encrypted part of an Authenticator contains a timestamp and the client principal name, among other items.
As shown in Figure 1, below, the Kerberos V5 protocol consists of the following message exchanges between the client and the KDC, and the client and the application service:
The Authentication Service (AS) Exchange
The client obtains an "initial" ticket from the Kerberos
authentication server (AS), typically a Ticket Granting Ticket
(TGT). The AS-REQ message and the AS-REP message are the request
and the reply message, respectively, between the client and the
AS.
The Ticket Granting Service (TGS) Exchange
The client subsequently uses the TGT to authenticate and request a
service ticket for a particular service, from the Kerberos
ticket-granting server (TGS). The TGS-REQ message and the TGS-REP
message are the request and the reply message respectively between
the client and the TGS.
The Client/Server Authentication Protocol (AP) Exchange
The client then makes a request with an AP-REQ message, consisting
of a service ticket and an authenticator that certifies the
client's possession of the ticket session key. The server may
optionally reply with an AP-REP message. AP exchanges typically
negotiate session-specific symmetric keys.
Usually, the AS and TGS are integrated in a single device also known
as the KDC.
+--------------+
+--------->| KDC |
AS-REQ / +-------| |
/ / +--------------+
/ / ^ |
/ |AS-REP / |
| | / TGS-REQ + TGS-REP
| | / /
| | / /
| | / +---------+
| | / /
| | / /
| | / /
| v / v
++-------+------+ +-----------------+
| Client +------------>| Application |
| | AP-REQ | Server |
| |<------------| |
+---------------+ AP-REP +-----------------+
Figure 1: The Message Exchanges in the Kerberos V5 Protocol
In the AS exchange, the KDC reply contains the ticket session key,
among other items, that is encrypted using a key (the AS reply key)
shared between the client and the KDC. The AS reply key is typically
derived from the client's password for human users. Therefore, for
human users, the attack resistance strength of the Kerberos protocol
is no stronger than the strength of their passwords.
Source: KRUTZ, Ronald L. & VINES, Russel D., The CISSP Prep Guide: Mastering the
Ten Domains of Computer Security, John Wiley & Sons, 2001, Chapter 2: Access control
systems (page 40).
And
HARRIS, Shon, All-In-One CISSP Certification Exam Guide, McGraw-Hill/Osborne, 2002,
chapter 4: Access Control (pages 147-151).
and
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4556.txt
Question 945
The Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) was written to address which of the following that the Orange Book did not address?
Correct Answer: C
Section: Security Operation Adimnistration
Explanation/Reference:
TCSEC focused on confidentiality while ITSEC added integrity and availability as security goals.
The following answers are incorrect:
integrity and confidentiality. Is incorrect because TCSEC addressed confidentiality.
confidentiality and availability. Is incorrect because TCSEC addressed confidentiality.
none of the above. Is incorrect because ITSEC added integrity and availability as security goals.
Explanation/Reference:
TCSEC focused on confidentiality while ITSEC added integrity and availability as security goals.
The following answers are incorrect:
integrity and confidentiality. Is incorrect because TCSEC addressed confidentiality.
confidentiality and availability. Is incorrect because TCSEC addressed confidentiality.
none of the above. Is incorrect because ITSEC added integrity and availability as security goals.
Question 946
In biometric identification systems, at the beginning, it was soon apparent that truly positive identification could only be based on :
Correct Answer: B
Explanation/Reference:
Today implementation of fast, accurate reliable and user-acceptable biometric identification systems is already under way.
From: TIPTON, Harold F. & KRAUSE, MICKI, Information Security Management Handbook, 4th Edition, Volume 1, Page 7.
Today implementation of fast, accurate reliable and user-acceptable biometric identification systems is already under way.
From: TIPTON, Harold F. & KRAUSE, MICKI, Information Security Management Handbook, 4th Edition, Volume 1, Page 7.
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