Explanation
In a bankruptcy, equity ranks last. Preferred equity is one level above equity. Senior debt gets paid out first compared to junior debt, and secured debt is paid out first to the extent of the asset securing it (after which it counts as unsecured debt). Accounts payable and other short term liabilities are treated like unsecured creditors. Debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing ranks higher than any other asset as it is financing secured after the bankruptcy to continue the business.
Based on the above, statement I does not represent a correct ordering of seniority as equity is paid last.
Similarly, DIP financing receives higher priority than even secured debt, and therefore statement IV is incorrect. Therefore the only correct statements are II and III and Choice 'a' is the correct answer.

Explanation
The Basel II framework allows the use of the basic indicator approach, the standardized approach and the advanced measurement approaches for operational risk. There is no approach called the 'internal measurement approach' permitted for operational risk. Choice 'a' is therefore the correct answer.

Explanation
All the listed variables are relevant to management monitoring the credit risk profile of an institution, therefore Choice 'd' is the correct answer.

Explanation
A fat tailed distribution has more weight in the tails, and therefore at a high level of confidence the VaR estimate will be higher for a distribution with heavier tails. At relatively lower levels of confidence however, the situation is reversed as the heavier tailed distribution will have a VaR estimate lower than a thinner tailed distribution.
A higher level of kurtosis implies a 'peaked' distribution with fatter tails. Among the given choices, a distribution with kurtosis equal to 8 will have the heaviest tails, and therefore a higher VaR estimate. Choice 'a' is therefore the correct answer. Also refer to the tutorial about VaR and fat tails.

Explanation
Counterparty risk was difficult to gauge as it was impossible to know who the counterparty's counterparties were - this is true as the chain of financial transactions became excessively long with no central transparency of who owed who what. Bank A's credit depended upon the health of its counterparties, whose health in turn depended upon other counterparties. Thus Choice 'd' is a correct statement.
In an attempt to diversify, banks became more like each other - chasing yield, they piled into securitized products, and chasing diversification, they piled into different types of securitized products. The system as a whole became susceptible to small shocks in the assets underlying this vast edifice of structured products.
Therefore Choice 'a' represents a correct statement.
Choice 'c' does not represent a correct statement. Central banks had little data on the interconnections between institutions. They were aware of the large volumes of OTC transactions, but had no data to figure out who was connected to who, and who had what kind of exposures.
Choice 'b' represents a correct statement. Most transactions, other than exchange cleared futures trades (which were a tiny fraction of all trades) were cleared on a bilateral basis. The existence of central counterparties (CCPs) could have limited the impact of the crisis significantly as market participants would not have lost trust in each other, and the 'collateral damage' that was witnessed from a fall in housing prices, and thereby mortgage assets, would have been more contained.