Explanation
A non-financial firm such as a manufacturing company faces market risks similar to those faced by financial firms, except perhaps for not being exposed to risks from the equity markets. Non financial firms commonly face interest rate risks in respect of their debts, commodity price risks in respect of their inputs and products, and foreign currency risks in respect of their overseas operations. It is therefore not correct to say that the manufacturing firm does not face market risk because it does not take proprietary positions. While decisions on positions may not be actively taken, positions in foreign exchange (eg, through overseas debtors owing foreign currency, or liabilities in foreign currencies to overseas suppliers), commodities (through exposure to the need for raw material and inventory of finished goods) and interest rates (through debt financed, whether at fixed or floating rates) exist and create market risk much in the same way as they would for a proprietary position. Therefore statement I is incorrect.
While the firm faces market risks as an externality (as do financial firms for that matter, though often they seek such exposure to profit from their view on which way the externality will express itself), it is incorrect to say that these risks must be borne. They can be measured and hedged. Therefore statement II is incorrect.
The results of a manufacturing firm will include gains and losses arising from exposure to market risk, and will cloud the true profitability of the business. A firm with significant unhedged overseas sales may show vastly different results across time periods due to the FX gains and losses, making comparative assessment of profitability difficult. Therefore statement III is correct.
Market risks for a manufacturing firm may be directionally biased in terms of exposure, ie there may be a consistent 'long' position in a particular commodity that the firm produces, and a consistent 'short' position in the commodities consumed. In the same way, directional biases may exist in FX or interest rate exposures too.
Regardless of the bias, the existence of market risk exposures increase the volatility of the income stream and make the firm more risky, even though the long term expected returns from such exposures is zero (ie, returns may be zero but standard deviation is not). Therefore statement IV is not correct as market risks form non financialfirms do increase the overall risk of the firm.

Explanation
Counterparty risk was difficult to gauge as it was impossible to know who the counterparty's counterparties were - this is true as the chain of financial transactions became excessively long with no central transparency of who owed who what. Bank A's credit depended upon the health of its counterparties, whose health in turn depended upon other counterparties. Thus Choice 'd' is a correct statement.
In an attempt to diversify, banks became more like each other - chasing yield, they piled into securitized products, and chasing diversification, they piled into different types of securitized products. The system as a whole became susceptible to small shocks in the assets underlying this vast edifice of structured products.
Therefore Choice 'a' represents a correct statement.
Choice 'c' does not represent a correct statement. Central banks had little data on the interconnections between institutions. They were aware of the large volumes of OTC transactions, but had no data to figure out who was connected to who, and who had what kind of exposures.
Choice 'b' represents a correct statement. Most transactions, other than exchange cleared futures trades (which were atiny fraction of all trades) were cleared on a bilateral basis. The existence of central counterparties (CCPs) could have limited the impact of the crisis significantly as market participants would not have lost trust in each other, and the 'collateral damage' that was witnessed from a fall in housing prices, and thereby mortgage assets, would have been more contained.

Explanation
Credit risk is the risk from a borrower defaulting on moneys lent. Counterparty risk, on the other hand, is the risk that a counterparty to a derivativetransaction will be unable to pay at the time the transaction is in-the-money.
Credit risk therefore relates more to the banking book, counterparty risk relates more to the trading book.
Credit risk and counterparty risk differ in that for counterparty risk, the amount at risk fluctuates for counterparty risk depending upon the value of the underlying derivative. Counterparty risk generally starts at zero, for most swaps and other derivatives are near zero value at inception. Over time, as the prices of theunderlying instruments move, one party ends up owing money to the other. A deterioration in the financial situation of the party owing moneys may lead to a loss to the other party, resulting in counterparty risk.
Counterparty risk can also arise from stock lending operations and repo trades.
Credit risk on the other hand is the traditional risk of default by a borrower, or a bank's customer who has taken a loan or has an overdraft or other credit facility.
Statement I is therefore incorrect as credit riskand counterparty risks are different.
Statement II is correct as counterparty risk is 'contingent' in the sense it arises only if the transaction with the counterparty ends up being in-the-money, and the counterparty defaults.
Statement III is incorrect. The statement describes credit risk.
Statement IV is incorrect, as the exposure is known for moneys lent. Derivative exposures for the future are difficult to estimate, they can even turn from moneys owed to moneys due as the value of the underlying changes.

Explanation
Marginal probabilities of default are the probabilities for default for a given period, conditional on survival till the end of the previous period. Cumulative probabilities of default are probabilities of default by a point in time, regardless of when the default occurs. If the marginal probabilities of default for periods 1, 2... n are p1, p2...pn, then cumulative probability of default can be calculated as Cn = 1 - (1 - p1)(1-p2)...(1-pn). For this question, we can calculate the probability of default for year 3 as =1 - (1-2%)*(1-3%)*(1-4%) = 8.74%

Explanation
The probability of default would make the expected value of the future cash flows from both the corporate bond and the risk free bond identical. If p be the probability of default, the cash flows from the risky corporate bond would be
= (cash flows in the event of default x probability of default) + (cash flows without default x (1 - probability of default))
=> 5%*0 + (1 - 5%)*(1 + 12%) = (1 + Rf).
therefore Rf = 6.4%
(In reality investors would demand a 'credit risk premium' over and above the expected default loss rate. They are unlikely to be happy with just being compensated with exactly the expected default loss rate plus the risk-fre rate because the expected default loss rate itself is uncertain. They would demand some premium over and above what the default rate alone might mathematically imply above the risk free rate. In this question, this credit risk premium is ignored.)